Integrating a historical perspective into studies of prejudicial attitudes facilitates the interpretation of paradoxical findings of the kind cited in the target article. History also encourages research to move beyond the study of prejudice and to consider institutional and structural forces that maintain social inequities. Multilevel approaches can study these factors in both field and laboratory studies.

Using historical data from the Utah Population Database, this analysis finds significant, consistent, but small adverse mortality effects for mothers after age 50 who had mostly sons. Examination of age-dependent effects indicates that this association increases with mother’s age. Additionally, mothers who had mostly daughters faced mortality risks that increased with age. Offspring sex composition did not have a significant effect on paternal mortality. Interaction analyses were conducted to examine the effect of offspring sex composition with regard to historical period, (...) residential location, socioeconomic status, and childhood survival. No other interactions were found to be statistically significant. Having mostly boys remained detrimental to maternal mortality regardless of childhood survival. (shrink)

Recently, Rueger and Sharp (1996) and Koperski (1998) have been concerned to show that certain procedural accounts of model confirmation are compromised by non-linear dynamics. We suggest that the issues raised are better approached by considering whether chaotic data analysis methods allow for reliable inference from data. We provide a framework and an example of this approach.

El editor reúne a distintos miembros de la Advisory Council of the British Humanist Association para escribir sobre conceptos, tales como la moralidad, la educación moral, la ética, los medios de comunicación, la muerte o el futuro. Algunos de estos autores son: Cyril Bibby, Raymond Firth, Margaret Knight, Lord Francis Williams, Antony Flew, Peter Henderson, James Hemming, Morris Ginsberg, Lord Ritchie-Calder, Lord Boyd Orr, Kathleen Nott, Brigid Brophy, Cristopher Longuet-Higgins, Kingsley Martin, P. Sargant Florence, Theodore Besterman, F.A.E. Crew, H.J. Eysenck (...) o Sir Karl Popper. (shrink)

ResumeUn énoncé p est nécessaire, selon Chrysippe, si et seulement si p est vrai et si, étant susceptible ?on;être faux, les circonstances extérieures s'opposent à ce qu'il soit faux. On s'appuie sur cet éclaircissement pour construire le carré ou plutôt les deux carres des modalités. Ce qu'il y a de spécifique dans la logique de Chrysippe, c'est que du nécessaire àľimpossible que non la conséquence est valide, mais qu'il n'en va pas de même pour la conséquence converse.SummaryA sentence p is (...) necessary, according to Chrysippe iff p is true and, p being susceptible of being false, the external circumstances prevent it from being false. This explanation is used in order to construct the modal square or rather the two modal squares. Something is specific in the Chrysippean logic: from the necessity of p we may validly conclude that it is impossible that not p, while the converse conclusion is not valid.ZusammenfassungNach Chrysipp ist ein Satz p dann und nur dann notwendig, wenn p wahr ist und falls p falsch sein könnte, die äusseren Umstände verhindern, dass p falsch ist. Auf diese Bestimmung aufbauend wird das Quadrat – oder werden vielmehr die beiden Quadrate – der Modalitäten konstruiert. Das Besondere an Chrysipps Logik lässt sich daran erkennen, dass von der Notwen‐digkeit von p auf die Unmöglichkeit von nicht‐p geschlossen werden darf, nicht aber umgekehrt. (shrink)

The author examines the postmodern conception of individuality, presented by Jules Lipovetsky, as contrasted with the thomistic concept od person. He shows, that with the loss of the conviction, that the human person deserves dignity, the future of the democracy in the civil state as well as the civilization itself would be seriously endangered.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions AGOSTINO NIFO'S EARLY VIEWS ON IMMORTALITY Various historians of Renaissance philosophy have taken some notice of the prolific author and important philosopher of the late 15th and early 16th centuries, Agostino Nifo (1470-1538), x but no one has yet studied his writings in a methodical and exhaustive fashion. 2 He not only published philosophical works in logic, physics, psychology and metaphysics, but he also authored treatises (...) on humanist topics? Recent scholars have tended to concentrate their attention on his psychological doctrines, no doubt because he was one of the major opponents of Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525) during the immortality controversy.4 Nifo published his De Immortalitate Animae in 1518 as a reply to the De lmmortalitate Ardmae, On the year of Nifo)s birth, see Bruno Nardi, Saggi sull'aristotelismo padovano dal secolo xav al xvl ('Florence, 1958), p. 284, n. 8. There is contemporary evidence that he died on January 18, 1538. See Bartolommeo Capasso, "Le cronache de li antiqui ri del regno di Napoli di D. Gaspare Fuscolill0," Archivio storico per le province napoletane, I (1876), p. 538. The standard bio-bibliography still remains Pasquale Tuozzi, "Agostino Nifo 9 le sue opere," Atti e memorie della R. Accademia di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti in Padova, Nuova scrie, XX (Padua, 1904), pp. 63-86. But see also Giuseppr Tommasino, Tra umanisti e filosoft (Maddaloni, 1921), Porte I, pp. 123-147; and Edward P. Mahoney, "A Note on Agostino Nifo," Philological Quarterly (forthcoming). z See Franeeseo Fiorentino, Pietro Pomponazzi; Studi storici su la scuola bolognese e padovana del secolo xvI (Florence, 1868); Carlo Giacon, La seconda scolastica: 1 grandi commentatori di San Tommaso (Milan, 1944); Etienne Gilson, "L'affaire de l'immortalit6 de l'fime ~t Venise at* d6but du xvIe si~ele," in Umanesirno europeo e uraanesimo veneziano, ed. Vittore Branea (Florence, 1963), pp. 31-61; Miehele Giorgiantonio, "Un nostro filosofo dimentieato dcl '400 (Luea Prassicio e Agostino Nifo)," Sophia, XVI (1948), pp. 212-214 and 303-312; Bruno Nardi, Saggi sulraristotelismo padovano dal secolo x]v al xvI (Florence, 1958); idem, Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del Rinascimento Italiano (Rome, 1945); Giovanni di NapoH, L'immortalitd delranima nel Rinascimento ('Turin, 1963); John Herman Randall, Jr., The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science (Padua, 1961); Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, I (Stuttgart, 1964); Eugenio Garin, La cultura [ilosofica del Rinascimento Italiano (Florence, 1961); idem, Storia della filosofia italiana, II (Turin, 1966). See Nifo's De Armorum Literarumque Comparatione Commentariolus (Naples, 1526); De Pulchro et Amore (Rome, 1531); De Re Aulica (Naples, 1534); and Prima Pars Opusculorum (Venice, 1535). The second of these works has been studied by Jules Houdoy, La beaut~ des femmes dans la litt#rature et darts rart du xII" au xvIe si~cle; Analyse du livre de A. Niphus du Beau et de l'amour (Paris, 1876). 4 For recent discussion of the immortality controversy, see Etienne Gilson, "Autour de Pomponazzi, ProbMmatique de l'immortalit~ de l'~me en Italic au d~but du xvIe si~.cle," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litt~raire du moyen dge, Ann6e 1961, pp. 163-179; Giovanni di Napoli, op. cit., especially pp. 227-338; Paul Oskar Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (Stanford, 1964), pp. 72-90; Bruno Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi (Florence, 1965); Martin Pine, "Pomponazzi and the Problem of 'Double Truth'," Journal ot the History of Ideas, XXIX (1968), pp. 163-176; Harold Shulsky, "Paduan Epistemology and the Doctrine of the One Mind," lournal of the History of Philosophy, VI (1968), pp. 341-361. [451] 452 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (1516) of Pomponazzi, who had argued that personal immortality cannot be philosophically demonstrated, s But while these scholars correctly point out that Nifo abandoned an Averroist interpretation of Aristotle concerning the unity of the intellect and the immortality of the soul for the position which they assume to be Thomistic, they are not precise as to just when Nile made the shift.6 They have not observed that in his first two printed works, namely, the commentary on Averroes' Destructio Destructionum (1497) and the early commentary on the De Anima (1503), Nifo explicitly accepts Averroes as the... (shrink)

"2009 realisierte [Jules Spinatsch] im Rahmen seiner "Surveillance Panorama Projects" während des Wiener Opernballs ein riesiges Panorama, das aus 10 008 Einzelbildern besteht. Zwei computergesteuerte Kameras nahmen diese vom Einlass der rund 7000 Gäste um 20:32 Uhr bis zum Ende des Balls um 05:17 Uhr auf. Das Sittengemälde aus chronologisch zusammengesetzten Fragmenten des umtriebigen Gesamtgeschehens zeigt eine ganze Reihe fotografischer Genres: Porträts, Stillleben, filmische Szenen und Paparazzi-Schnappschüsse.... Das Opernball-Panorama führt die Fotografie als Medium der Dokumentation, aber auch Überwachung vor (...) Augen."--P.5 of v.3. (shrink)

The term 'implicit bias' has very swiftly been incorporated into philosophical discourse. Our aim in this paper is to scrutinise the phenomena that fall under the rubric of implicit bias. The term is often used in a rather broad sense, to capture a range of implicit social cognitions, and this is useful for some purposes. However, we here articulate some of the important differences between phenomena identified as instances of implicit bias. We caution against ignoring these differences: it is likely (...) they have considerable significance, not least for the sorts of normative recommendations being made concerning how to mitigate the bad effects of implicit bias. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 249 Girolamo Balduino: Ricerche sulla logica della Scuola di Padova nel Rinascimento. By Giovanni Papuli. (Bark Lacerta, Universith di Bari, Pubblicazioni dell'lstituto di filosofia, 12, 1967. Pp. 313. no price.) The philosophers at the University of Padua during the late Middle Ages and Renaissance arc attracting much renewed interest. This study makes accessible again the logical philosophy of Girolamo Balduino, professor at Padua during the second quarter (...) of the sixteenth century. Like other thinkers of his period, 13alduino follows the logic of Aristotle, and looks for progress within the ancient and mediaeval tradition, not for radically new doctrines. He continues the traditional interpretation of Aristotle by Averroes, for whom logic is only an instrumental habitus, a tool or method of demonstration. About the final contribution of the school of Padua to the improvement of Aristotelian logic was the doctrine of regressive demonstration, where demonstration terminates in or discloses the definition. Zabarella's well-known teaching on this point seems to be derived entirely from Balduino. Contrary to the interpretation of Cassirer, followed by Randall, this regressive demonstration is not a universal method of inquiry and is not at all like, and not the historical source of, the new method of Galileo. Papuli's book is solidly based on the original Latin texts, in notes, which are of great value in view of the fact that Balduino's works have been out of print since 1573. Not all of Papuli's interpretations are beyond criticism (e.g., p. 296), but he has done a service in enabling us to reestablish contact with one of the last significant commentators on Aristotle's logic. PAUL J. W. MILLER University of Colorado Documents sur la vie de Jules-Cdsar Vanini de Taurisano. By Emile Namer. (Bari: Adriatica Editrice, n.d.=Univcrsith degli Studi di Bari, Pubblicazioni delFIstituto di Filosofia, II serie, Testi e Documenti, I. Pp. 196+22 facsimile illustrations) Giulio Cesare Vanini (1585-1619) ranks with Giordano Bruno as a modern hero of freedom of philosophical expression. He was tortured and then burned at the stake in Toulouse at the age of thirty-four, because of the unorthodoxy of his views. For this reason, he has drawn more attention than is perhaps deserved on the basis of his rather mediocre writings, which are little more than a tissue of plagiarisms culled from Pomponazzi, Cardano, J. C. Scaliger, and others. In this volume, Emile Namer has collected the scattered documents dealing with Vanini's life and activities. This is a valuable service, for it should enable scholars to disentangle fact from fiction and reality from myth. There has been so much heated discussion regarding Vanini that it is now time that someone should attempt to establish the precise facts and to reevaluate Vanini's place in intellectual history. In the past, writings about him have been governed more often by emotion than by reason. Namer prints documents from Naples, London, Paris, Simancas, and Toulouse. Some of these have been printed before in various journal articles, but it is valuable to have them all together in a single volume. In addition, he prints relevant excerpts concerning--as one of them put it--le douzi~me apostre de Satan, including material from Mersenne, Garasse, and others. He also includes a series of facsimiles of sample pages from the documents which he prints. All in all Namer's work is competently 250 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY done, though perhaps a bit more annotation to put the documents in historical perspective would have been desirable. In any case this little volume must be one of the bases for any future serious biographical or interpretative studies dealing with Vanini. Moreover, it shouM also be useful for scholars dealing with more general questions of seventeenth-century intellectual, religious, and social history. Unfortunately, there is no index, nor bibliography of earlier literature on Vanini, and the Introduction is perhaps too brief to orient the reader who has little previous knowledge of Vanini. CHARLES B. SCHMITT University oJ Leeds Tommaso Campanella: Renaissance Pioneer o[ Modern Thought. By Bernardino M. Bonansea. (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1969. Pp. xi 421. $14.50) This excellent critical study of the life and... (shrink)

How to Read the Old Testament. By Etienne Charpentier. Pp.124, London, SCM Press, 1982, £3.95. How to Read the New Testament. By Etienne Charpentier. Pp.129, London, SCM Press, 1982. £3.95. Beginning Old Testament Study. Edited by John Rogerson. Pp.vi, 157, London, SPCK, 1982, £3.95. Welt aus der die Bibel kommt Welt aus der die Bibel kommt: Biblische Hil ‘swissenschaften’. By Mechthild Kellermann, Stanisław Medala, Michele Piccirillo and Eugene Sitarz. Pp.263, Kevelaer, Butzon und Bercker; Stuttgart, Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1982, DM 28. (...) The Structure of Biblical Myths. The Structure of Biblical Myths. By Heinz Westman. Pp.xxii, 477, Dallas, Spring Publications, 1983, no price given. Toward Old Testament Ethics. Toward Old Testament Ethics. By Walter C. Kaiser, Pp.xii, 345, Grand Rapids, Academie Books, 1983, £13.95. Das Evangelium and die Evangelien. Das Evangelium and die Evangelien. Edited by Peter Stuhlmacher. Pp.viii, 454, Tubingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1983, DM 178. Once More Astonished Once More Astonished: The Parables of Jesus. By Jan Lambrecht. Pp.xiv, 245, New York, Crossroad Publishing, 1983, $9.95. Mark: The Gospel as Story. Mark: The Gospel as Story. By Ernest Best. Pp.vii, 155, Edinburgh, T & T. Clark, 1983, £8.95. The ‘Son of Man’ as The Son of God. The ‘Son of Man’ as The Son of God. By Seyoon Kim. Pp.x, 118, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1983, DM 48. Paul and the Law. Paul and the Law. By Heikki Räisänen. Pp.xi, 320, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1983, DM 108. Pauline Christianity. Pauline Christianity. By John Ziesler, Pp.ix, 157, Oxford University Press, 1983, £3.50. God as the Mystery of the World God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundations of the Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism. By Eberhard Jüngel, translated by Darrell L. Guder.Pp. xvi, 414, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1983, £14.95. Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education. Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education. By Edward Farley. Pp.xiv, 206, Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1983, $14.50. Unity in Theology Unity in Theology: Lonergan's Framework for Theology in its New Context. By Michael C. O'Callaghan. Pp.xlii, 553, Lanham, University Press of America, 1980, $24.50, $16.75. Understanding Karl Rahner, vol.1: A Theologian in Search of a Philosophy. Understanding Karl Rahner, vol.1: A Theologian in Search of a Philosophy. By George Vass. Pp.xix, 153, London, Sheed and Ward, 1985, £8.50. Understanding Karl Rahner, vol.2: The Mystery of Man and the Foundations of a Theological System. By George Vass. Pp.xvii, 200, London, Sheed and Ward, 1985, £9.50. Ignatius von Loyola Ignatius von Loyola: Die Exerzitien. By Lothar Lies, Pp. 142, Innsbruck‐Vienna, Tyrolia Verlag, 1983, DM 26. The Name of Christ The Name of Christ: The Names of Jesus Used by the Early Cristians, The Development of the Jesus Prayer. By Irenée Hausherr. Pp.viii, 358, Kalamazoo, Cistercian Publications, 1978, $8.00. The Easter Sermons of Gregory of Nyssa. The Easter Sermons of Gregory of Nyssa. Edited by Andreas Spira and Christopher Klock. Pp.x, 384, Cambridge, The Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1981, $10.00. Anonymus in Ecclesiasten Commentarius qui dicitur Catena Trium Patrum. Anonymus in Ecclesiasten Commentarius qui dicitur Catena Trium Patrum. Edited by Santo Lucá. Pp.lvi, 139, Turnhout, Brepols, and Leuven, University Press, 1983, no price given. The Medieval Inquistion. The Medieval Inquistion. By Albert Clement Shannon. Pp viii, 153, Washington D.C., Augustinian College Press, 1983, $10.00. John Calvin. John Calvin. Edited by G.R. Potter and M. Greengrass. Pp.xvi, 176, London, Edward Arnold, 1983, £4.95. When Fathers Ruled. Family Life in Reformation Europe. When Fathers Ruled. Family Life in Reformation Europe. By Steven Ozment. Pp.x, 238, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1983, £14.85. The Apocalypse in English Renaissance Thought and Literature. The Apocalypse in English Renaissance Thought and Literature. Edited by C.A. Patrides and Joseph Wittreich. Pp. ix, 452, Manchester University Press, 1984, £37.50. The Contribution of British Writers between 1560 and 1830 to the Interpretation of Revelation 13.16–18. By David Brady, Pp.vii, 335, Tubingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1983, DM 98. Typologies in England, 1650–1820. Typologies in England, 1650–1820. By Paul J. Korshin. Pp.xvii, 437, Princeton University Press, 1982, £26.10. The Great Debate on Miracles. The Great Debate on Miracles. By R.M. Burns. Pp.305, Lewisburg, Bucknell University Press, 1981, £12.00. Coleridge's Religious Imagination. Coleridge's Religious Imagination. By Stephen Happel. Pp.xii, 943, Salzburg, Institut für Anglistik und Amerikanistik, 1983, no price given. Jacques Maritain and the French Catholic Intellectuals. Jacques Maritain and the French Catholic Intellectuals. By Bernard Doering, Pp.x, 268, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1983, £18.25. Dorothy Day: A Biography. Dorothy Day: A Biography. By William D. Miller. Pp.xv, 527, New York, Harper and Row, 1982, $18.00, $10.50. For God and Clarity: New Essays in Honour of Austin Farrer. For God and Clarity: New Essays in Honour of Austin Farrer. Edited by Jeffrey C. Easton and Ann Loades. Pp.xiii, 205, Allison Park, Pickwick Publications; Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1983, £11.75. God, Free Will, and Morality. God, Free Will, and Morality. By Robert J. Richman. Pp.xi, 195, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1983, $36.95. God and Skepticism: A Study in Skepticism and Fideism. God and Skepticism: A Study in Skepticism and Fideism. By Terence Penelhum. Pp.xii, 186, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1983, $34.00. Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism. Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism. By Gary Gutting. Pp.xi, 192, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1982, £11.20. A Philosopher's Search for the Infinite. A Philosopher's Search for the Infinite. By Jules M. Brady. Pp.94, New York, Philosophical Library, 1983, $10.00 Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol.3. Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol.3. By Hilary Putnam. Pp.xviii, 312, Cambridge University Press, 1983, £22.50. Perception, Learning and the Self. Perception, Learning and the Self. By D.W. Hamlyn. Pp.viii, 311, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, £14.95. Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice. Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Pp.xxvii, 351, Cambridge University Press, 1983, £25.00. Plato: Hippias Major. Plato: Hippias Major. Translated with a commentary and essay by Paul Woodruff. Pp.xvi, 211, Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1983, £12.50. Max Scheler: The Man and his Work. Max Scheler: The Man and his Work. By John H. Nota, translated by T. Plantinga and J. Nota. Pp.vii, 213, Chicago, Franciscan Herald Press, 1983, $12.00. Searching: Practices and Beliefs of the Religious Cults and Human Potential Groups. Searching: Practices and Beliefs of the Religious Cults and Human Potential Groups. By Harriet S. Mosatche. Pp.432, New York, Straven Educational Press, 1983, £10.95. (shrink)

We argue that there is a large class of questions—specifically questions about how to epistemically evaluate environments that currently available epistemic theories are not well-suited for answering, precisely because these questions are not about the epistemic state of particular agents or groups. For example, if we critique Facebook for being conducive to the spread of misinformation, then we are not thereby critiquing Facebook for being irrational, or lacking knowledge, or failing to testify truthfully. Instead, we are saying something about the (...) social media environment. In this paper, we first propose that a new branch of epistemology–Environmental Epistemology–is needed to address these questions. We argue that environments can be proper objects of epistemic evaluation, and that there are genuine epistemic norms that govern environments. We then provide a positive account of these norms and conclude by considering how recognition of these norms may require us to rethink longstanding epistemic debates. (shrink)

Optimal protective responses to long-term risks depend on rational perceptions of ambiguous risks and uncertain time horizons. Our study examined the joint influence of uncertain delay and risk in an original sample of business owners and managers. We found that many subjects disliked uncertainty in the timing of an outcome, a reaction we term ``lottery timing risk aversion.'' Such aversion to uncertain timing was positively related to aversion to ambiguous probabilities for lotteries involving storm damage risks. This association suggests that (...) uncertainty may be processed similarly in both the risk and time dimensions. (shrink)

Recently, Rueger and Sharp (1996) and Koperski (1998) have been concerned to show that certain procedural accounts of model confirmation are compromised by non‐linear dynamics. We suggest that the issues raised are better approached by considering whether chaotic data analysis methods allow for reliable inference from data. We provide a framework and an example of this approach.

Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants’ resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher and lower degrees of involvement. Obligations to do one's bit might provide our (...) agency-pooling mechanism. When they do, we act together by virtue of satisfying them (degree 2). Conversely, some shared activities involve no obligation (degree 0). In the second part, I argue shared agency theory is best served by a non-moralistic conception of obligation, one on which co-participants’ obligations need be neither strict-performance obligations, nor directed ones. Overall, my arguments suggest that we can choose how to coordinate normatively our shared activities. (shrink)

Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia , Woodin’s Ω-Logic.

In this book, the author of "Language, Truth and Logic" tackles one of the central issues of philosophy - how we can know anything - by setting out all the sceptic's arguments and trying to counter them one by one.

Research programs in empirical psychology from the past two decades have revealed implicit biases. Although implicit processes are pervasive, unavoidable, and often useful aspects of our cognitions, they may also lead us into error. The most problematic forms of implicit cognition are those which target social groups, encoding stereotypes or reflecting prejudicial evaluative hierarchies. Despite intentions to the contrary, implicit biases can influence our behaviours and judgements, contributing to patterns of discriminatory behaviour. These patterns of discrimination are obviously wrong and (...) unjust. But in remedying such wrongs, one question to be addressed concerns responsibility for implicit bias. Unlike some paradigmatic forms of wrongdoing, such discrimination is often unintentional, unendorsed, and perpetrated without awareness; and the harms are particularly damaging because they are cumulative and collectively perpetrated. So, what are we to make of questions of responsibility? In this article, we outline some of the main lines of recent philosophical thought, which address questions of responsibility for implicit bias. We focus on (a) the kind of responsibility at issue; (b) revisionist versus nonrevisionist conceptions of responsibility as applied to implicit bias; and (c) individual, institutional, and collective responsibility for implicit bias. (shrink)

Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for (...) blameworthiness, does not support these claims. I suggest that the arguments for the claim that individuals are not liable for blame are invalid, and that there is some reason to suppose that individuals are, at least sometimes, liable to blame for the extent to which they are influenced in behaviour and judgment by implicit biases. I also argue against the claim that it is counter-productive to see bias as something for which individuals are blameworthy; rather, understanding implicit bias as something for which we are liable to blame could be constructive. (shrink)

Jules Coleman, one of the world's most influential philosophers of law, here expounds his recent views on a range of important issues in legal theory. Coleman offers for the first time an explicit account of the pragmatist method that has long informed his work, and takes on the views of highly respected contemporaries such as Ronald Dworkin and Joseph Raz.

Argument-mapping software abounds, and one of the reasons is that using the software has been shown to teach/promote/improve critical thinking skills. These positive results are very encouraging, but they also raise the question of whether the computer tutorial environment is producing these results, or whether learning argument mapping, even with just paper and pencil, is sufficient. Based on the results of two empirical studies, I argue that the basic skill of being able to represent an argument diagrammatically plays an important (...) role in the improvement of critical-thinking skills. While these studies do not offer a direct comparison between the two methods, it is important for anyone wishing to employ argument mapping in the classroom to know that significant results can be obtained even with the most rudimentary of tools. (shrink)

Privacy is protected in biobank-based research in the US primarily by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Privacy Rule and the Federal Policy for Protection of Human Subjects. Neither rule, however, was created to function in the unique context of biobank research, and therefore neither applies to all biobank-based research. Not only is it challenging to determine when the HIPAA Privacy Rule or the Common Rule apply, but these laws apply different standards to protect privacy. In addition, many other (...) federal and state laws may be applicable to a particular biobank, researcher, or project. US law also does not directly address international sharing of data or specimens outside of the EU–US Safe Harbor Agreement, which only applies to receipt of data by certain US entities from EU countries, and is in the process of revision. Although new rules would help clarify privacy protections in biobanking, any implemented changes should be studied to determine the sufficiency of the protections as well as its ability to facilitate or hinder international collaborations. (shrink)

This book by one of America's preeminent legal theorists is concerned with the conflict between the goals of justice and economic efficiency in the allocation of risk, especially risk pertaining to safety. The author approaches his subject from the premise that the market is central to liberal political, moral, and legal theory. In the first part of the book, he rejects traditional "rational choice" liberalism in favor of the view that the market operates as a rational way of fostering stable (...) relationships and institutions within communities of individuals with broadly divergent conceptions of the good. However, markets are needed most where they are most difficult to create and sustain, and one way to understand contract law in liberal legal theory, according to Professor Coleman, is as an institution designed to reduce uncertainty and thereby make markets possible. Another target of this book is the prevalent view that tort law helps rectify market failures when transaction costs are too high to permit contracting. The author argues instead that tort law should be understood as a way of rectifying wrongful losses not inefficient exchanges. (shrink)

The Ellsberg Paradox documented the aversion to ambiguity in the probability of winning a prize. Using an original sample of 266 business owners and managers facing risks from climate change, this paper documents the presence of departures from rationality in both directions. Both ambiguity-seeking behavior and ambiguity-averse behavior are evident. People exhibit ‘fear’ effects of ambiguity for small probabilities of suffering a loss and ‘hope’ effects for large probabilities. Estimates of the crossover point from ambiguity aversion (fear) to ambiguity seeking (...) (hope) place this value between 0.3 and 0.7 for the risk per decade lotteries considered, with empirical estimates indicating a crossover mean risk of about 0.5. Attitudes toward the degree of ambiguity also reverse at the crossover point. (shrink)

This book presents a learned and ingenious attempt to understand the origin and nature of philosophical inquiry. It draws on material from numerous disciplines and from all periods of philosophy and provides challenging arguments on a wide range of topics. The author constructs a hierarchy of ontological claims, beginning with perceptual experience, moving to language and science. He traces subtle and unexpected relations among these and concludes by offering a system for classifying philosophical theories which reveals why they take the (...) form they do and why philosophical dispute is ineradicable. The book offers many fresh insights into such topics as the nature of experience, the nature of language and that of philosophy itself. It will interest a wide range of philosophers, in particular those concerned with categorical schemes, grammar and ontology. (shrink)

When thinking about designing social media platforms, we often focus on factors such as usability, functionality, aesthetics, ethics, and so forth. Epistemic considerations have rarely been given the same level of attention in design discussions. This paper aims to rectify this neglect. We begin by arguing that there are epistemic norms that govern environments, including social media environments. Next, we provide a framework for applying these norms to the question of platform design. We then apply this framework to the real-world (...) case of long-form informational content platforms. We argue that many current long-form informational content platforms are epistemically unhealthy. The good news? We provide concrete advice on how to take steps toward improving their health! Specifically, we argue that they should change how they verify and authenticate content creators and how this information is displayed to content consumers. We conclude by connecting this guidance to broader issues about the epistemic health of platforms. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Jurisprudence: Method and Subject Matter Legality and Authority Positivism: Austin vs. Hart The Authority of Law Judicial Discretion Incorporationism and Legality Raz' s Theory of Authority Incorporationism and Authority Conclusion Postscript References.

Our focus here is on whether, when influenced by implicit biases, those behavioural dispositions should be understood as being a part of that person’s character: whether they are part of the agent that can be morally evaluated.[4] We frame this issue in terms of control. If a state, process, or behaviour is not something that the agent can, in the relevant sense, control, then it is not something that counts as part of her character. A number of theorists have argued (...) that individuals do not have control, in the relevant sense, over the operation of implicit bias. We will argue that this claim is mistaken. We articulate and develop a notion of control that individuals have with respect to implicit bias, and argue that this kind of control can ground character-based evaluation of such behavioural dispositions. (shrink)

Research programs in empirical psychology over the past few decades have led scholars to posit implicit biases. This is due to the development of innovative behavioural measures that have revealed aspects of our cognitions which may not be identified on self-report measures requiring individuals to reflect on and report their attitudes and beliefs. But what does it mean to characterise such biases as implicit? Can we satisfactorily articulate the grounds for identifying them as bias? And crucially, what sorts of cognitions (...) are in fact being measured; what mental states or processes underpin such behavioural responses? In this paper, we outline some of the philosophical and empirical issues engaged when attempting to address these three questions. Our aim is to provide a constructive taxonomy of the issues, and how they interrelate. As we will see, any view about what implicit bias is may depend on a range of prior theoretical choices. (shrink)

Next SectionIn emphasizing the importance of the separability thesis, legal philosophers have inadequately appreciated other philosophically important ways in which law and morality are or might be connected with one another. In this article, I argue that the separability thesis cannot shoulder the philosophical burdens that it has been asked to bear. I then turn to two issues of greater importance to jurisprudence. These are ‘the moral semantics of law’ and ‘the normativity of theory construction in jurisprudence’. The moral semantics (...) claim is that legal content is best understood as moral directives about what is to be done and who is to decide what is to be done. The problem is that legal positivists typically hold that only social facts contribute to the content of law, and it is hard to see how a positivist can hold both the social-facts claim and the moral-semantics claim. I argue that not only are the two claims consistent with one another, but that legal positivists must hold some version of the moral semantics claim if they are to make sense of the claim that legal reasons purport to be content-independent moral reasons for acting. In Section 3 of the article, I take up the question of whether theory construction in jurisprudence is normative or descriptive. This is hard to do in part because so little attention has been paid to correctly formulating the issue. I suggest a demanding test for descriptivism; namely, that an adequate analysis of law can be provided entirely in terms of its formal features. I then defend this claim against three arguments designed to show because governance by law is necessarily desirable or valuable that, we cannot characterize law without making reference to those values or to other material features of law. This constitutes a limited but powerful defence of descriptive jurisprudence. (shrink)

The first part of this book is a translation of a philosophical work by the Breton philosopher Jules Lequyer, which explores questions of divine justice and human equality. The second part is a biography of Lequyer by Donald Wayne Viney, based on Prosper Hemon's life of Lequyer, and other material.

Philosophers have had a lot to say about blame, much less about praise. In this paper, I follow some recent authors in arguing that this is a mistake. However, unlike these recent authors, the reasons I identify for scrutinising praise are to do with the ways in which praise is, systematically, unjustly apportioned. Specifically, drawing on testimony and findings from social psychology, I argue that praise is often apportioned in ways that reflect and entrench existing structures of oppression. Articulating what (...) is going wrong here helps us to see what to do about it. (shrink)